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The United States is burdened with far more debt now than ever before. The nation's challenging economic situations will demand significant reductions in discretionary is one of several competing efforts in the area of partnership building and security cooperation, but the only one that has the capability to integrate military and civilian capabilities providing a variety of low-cost, high value returns in the counterinsurgency environment. DoD must prioritize cost reductions by reducing or eliminating missions and programs, which while beneficial, are not value-added enough to be retained in the defense budget. Will the SPP be such a program?
State Partnership Program: Enduring in Post Conflict, Fiscally Constrained Environment
Following each period of protracted military engagement in the 20th century, the United States has significantly reduced its armed forces end-strength and defense spending. The Department of Defense (DoD) was dramatically reduced at the conclusion of both world wars, and capabilities were slashed following operations in Korea and Vietnam.
1 With all U.S. combat forces out of Iraq and the cessation of kinetic operations on the horizon in Afghanistan, the U.S. begins its historic transition between war and what comes after. 2 The current drawdown is proving to be a greater challenge than its predecessors, in part because pervasive security threats are increasing in scale and scope, but also because of a shift in national interest to the Asian-Pacific region.
Add to this complexity an ongoing global economic crisis that has prompted Western allies to sharply curtail defense spending, this period of retraction appears grave even by historical standards.
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The United States is burdened with far more debt now than during any previous retrenchments. 4 The nation's challenging fiscal situations will demand significant reductions in discretionary spending and a reprioritization of global strategic objectives.
While the pentagon is postured to cut 100,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines, and reduce the base budget $487 billion over the next ten years, it must remain focused on the national security strategy and the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of the global security environment.
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The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a DoD security cooperation program administered by the National Guard Bureau (NGB). It supports the National Security Strategy (NSS) and achieves U.S. national security objectives and corresponding end-2 states through planning, coordinating, and conducting SPP activities. The mission of the SPP is to improve the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC's) ability to create military-to-military, and in some cases civil-to-military relationships that develop "long-term global security while building enduring partnership capacity across all levels of society." 6 The program partners the military of a nation requesting assistance with the National Guard of a state or territory that meets pre-determined compatibility requirements.
This paper will argue for the SPP enduring in a post conflict, fiscally constrained environment, faced with the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the looming "fiscal cliff" of sequestration expected to take effect on January 2, 2013. I will expound upon the mandated Congressional Research Service (CRS) study, as well as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed Government Accountability Office (GAO) study, and will culminate with recommendations for areas requiring improvement prior to expanding and fully resourcing this low cost, strategically relevant program.
The original intent of the SPP was to develop relationships and assist in reforming the defense establishments of the former Soviet states, primarily through military-to-military engagements. This engagement would also provide valuable training for the National Guard. Today, organizations conduct these activities for the complementary purposes of promoting national security cooperation objectives through mutual understanding, supporting the Department of State (DOS) and GCC's theater security cooperation strategies and building enduring relationships and interoperability. 7 As noted by Terrence Kelly in the Rand Security Cooperation study, security assistance programs that provide advice or assistance, like the SPP, "forms the bedrock of security 3 cooperation and helps to lay the groundwork for building relationships with allies and other partners." 8 The NSS has emphasized the importance of strengthening security cooperation with other countries. It utilizes the DoD as a way of promoting stability and building partner capacity around the world. 9 The SPP is one of several competing efforts in the area of partnership building and security cooperation, but the only one that has the capability to integrate military and civilian capabilities providing a variety of low-cost, high value returns in the counterinsurgency environment.
For over 20 years, the program has demonstrated sustained accomplishments on a remarkably small budget. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, the program persevered on $12 million; 10 in FY 2011 it operated on just $13.2 million. 11 As DoD prioritizes military spending to adjust to a new era of fiscal austerity, they will have to decide whether to reduce or eliminate funding of programs and missions that while beneficial, are not value-added enough to be retained in the FY2013 and future budgets. 12 Will the SPP be such a program?
The evolution of SPP from its roots in the emerging Baltic countries, to enduring partnerships in 70 nations has long surpassed ad-hoc operating procedures and directives. for existing and pensioned forces, and organizational and maintenance operating costs will force tough prioritization decisions. 23 The pentagon must work out how to do so without compromising the ability to maintain America's national security. 24 Budget Control Act
The BCA of 2011, enacted by the 112 th United States Congress, brought to close the debt-ceiling crisis on which the United States was perilously close to defaulting. In exchange for increasing the debt limit to $2.1 trillion, a $900 billion increase, the bill specified discretionary spending cuts of $917 billion over the next ten years, of which $21 billion must be applied to FY2012 budget. 25 The goal of the legislation was to cut at least $1.2-$1.5 trillion of discretionary spending over the period of 2012 to 2021. 26 The bill created a joint committee of congress (three of each House Republicans, House Democrats, Senate Republicans, and Senate Democrats; appropriately named the "super-committee") to craft a proposal that would reduce deficits by a minimum of $1.2 trillion over 10 years. 27 This bipartisan congressional committee was mandated to make a recommendation to congress by November 23, 2011 . 28 If a quorum of seven 7 committee members agreed to the drafted legislation, Congress was required to vote on it, without the admission of any amendments, and without any filibusters. 29 If the "supercommittee" failed to produce a deficit reduction bill with a minimum of $1.2 trillion in cutbacks by January 15, 2012, the discretionary spending limits would be revised, and the discretionary appropriations and direct spending would be reduced. 30 This would also trigger automatic across-the-board-cuts, also known as sequestrations. If the BCA goes into effect, consideration to dipping below that to 450,000 is already in discussion. 35 Such considerations will the reassessment of the national security strategy and the ability of DoD to respond and to shape the global environment in order to protect the United States. 36 8 DoD has commenced a wide-ranging review of all areas of the budget for future savings. A number of proposals under consideration determine how we can reduce spending without harming national security. 37 This sensible approach would reach new efficiencies by eliminating unnecessary redundancy and overhead, reevaluating modernization programs, and renovating the defense logistics program which will increase contract competition. 38 This approach enables DoD to get an unbiased review of all service components, assess risk, set priorities, and make smart choices. Lessons learned from prior drawdowns are that it is difficult to generate sufficient savings just through increased efficiencies. 39 DoD must prioritize cost reductions by reducing or eliminating missions and programs, which while beneficial, are not value-added enough to be retained in the defense budget. Will the SPP be such a program?
The "super-committee" failed to provide to congress sufficient deficit reductions Since the establishment of the first state partnerships, the SPP has evolved from a USEUCOM regional program into a sustained security cooperation global initiative.
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The program is now a key DoD and DOS security cooperation tool, facilitating cooperation across all aspects of the JIIM environment and civil-military affairs.
The SPP has continued to grow into what the National Guard today considers the "crown jewel" 45 ambassadors abroad. 49 Additionally, congressional attention was also tied to broader concerns that select "DoD security cooperation activities may encroach on, complicate, or conflict with DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) responsibilities and prerogatives."
50
The focus of SPP activities varies depending on the application for assistance by the partnering nation, the proficiencies of the supporting National Guard organization, and the overarching country goals of the respective U.S. ambassador and the GCC.
Engagements are individually tailored, based upon the needs and requests of the partnering nation, and assessments conducted by the DOS, GCC, and the supporting National Guard unit. Typical missions performed are:
• Subject matter expert exchanges.
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• Familiarizations: Demonstrations of specialized military capabilities and/or discussions of policy issues related to those capabilities.
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• Visits between senior leaders of a state National Guard and senior leaders of the partner nation's armed forces.
53
Traditional SPP activities have a common core of topics, such as disaster management and disaster relief activities, military education, command and control, search and rescue, border operations, military medicine, port security, and military justice. 54 Additional interactions also develop well beyond these common core topics and are tailored to the requests of assistance from the partnering nation, the input from the GCC and the country team, and the abilities of the supporting State's National Guard.
Congressional concerns were raised that SPP events in the past may have funded U.S. or foreign civilian participation when such funding was outside the scope of the funding authorities. SPP does not have a dedicated statutory authority; rather, it relies on numerous Title 10 and Title 22 statutory authorities to conduct its activities. The SPP is a superb tool that fosters a variety of military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civilian-to-civilian engagements using National Guard and U.S. states' capabilities. The SPP delivers programs and activities that build broad capabilities with our African partners. The habitual relationship's this builds adds tremendous value to our efforts. This program is very valuable to U.S. Africa Command, and we look forward to expanding it as our African partners request greater participation. I urge your continued support. 63 Despite written and verbal support from DOS and combatant commanders, written assessments and measurable outcomes have been both elusive and inconclusive. Focus on "outputs rather than outcomes" hamper justification of continued monetary support from program analysts. 64 Supported by a RAND report, security cooperation programs are difficult to assess due to the variance in each organization and scope of the engagement. 65 The integration of SPP activities has not always been thoroughly coordinated with either the combatant commanders or the U.S. embassy in the partnering nation. 66 This lack of coordination between the partnering state, the GCC, and the country team has resulted in missed opportunities to espouse linked engagement priorities.
Regardless of the accuracy of the allegation, the maturity and global influence of the program necessitates standardized event coordination procedures. The state, the combatant commander, and the ambassador must all be involved in every SPP activity planning process prior to any activity in a foreign country. 67 Last of all, some SPP activities are accomplished in coordination with U.S.
foreign assistance programs within both the DOS and USAID, organizations that have a larger scope of responsibility and influence in the partners' country. • SPP activities and events shall be planned, coordinated, and executed to achieve the security cooperation objectives of the GCC.
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• SPP activities shall be an integral component of the GCC's theater security cooperation plans, and to the maximum extent legally permissible, supported by the relevant Chief of Mission (COM). 73 
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• SPP activities shall be approved by the appropriate GCC, COM, and the U.S. Secretary of State as required. 74 • National Guard personnel, while in the United States, may conduct SPP activities in a Title 32 status. While conducting activities in a foreign country, National Guard personnel must be on Title 10 status. 75 The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:
• Serve as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for SPP policy and programs, and in those capacities consult with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the GCC.
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The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
• Ensure that each of the GCC's submits a detailed annual fiscal record of the SPP activities conducted that used any source of DoD funds, to include any civilian engagement activities that were conducted. 77 The GCC shall:
• Coordinate with the Chief of National Guard Bureau to ensure the best use of National Guard and partner nation assets in achieving the GCC's security Cooperation objectives and the national security objectives of the partner nation.
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• Incorporate SPP activities as a means to implement security cooperation plans. Review and approve as appropriate all proposed SPP activities. 79 
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• Coordinate with relevant U.S. Embassy Country Teams to obtain COM concurrence for SPP activities with a partner nation regardless of where the activities are to take place. 80 The issuance of the DTM was the first significant step forward in framing an 101 These measures of effectiveness should be constructed to encourage long-term performance improvement, and lead to the development of interim goals. Short-term progress objectives will allow incremental measures of progress and justify whether a program is making progress, requires additional resources, or requires corrective actions. 102 
Conclusion
The United States attains its national interests by applying a JIIM unity of effort that joins the acts of diplomacy with implementation by the military. No example is more pronounced than in the political-military realm of Phase Zero operations. 103 In cooperation, the National Military Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review Report recognize theater security cooperation and building partner capacity activities as priorities to this nation. Both documents emphasize the need to promote the development of new relationships, and strengthen enduring alliances. The nation's commitment to universal theater security cooperation arrangements promotes the idea of shared prosperity globally. 104 The National Military Strategy charges the GCC's with the responsibility of implementing security cooperation activities as one part of an interagency process led by the DOS. As such, the SPP acts as a force multiplier for the GCC's theater security cooperation plan. 105 
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The National Guard State Partnership Program is a proven, "low dollar, high impact program," 106 that pairs state National Guard with foreign nations -creating the ability to build enduring relationships while promoting national security objectives, stability, and partner building capacity. 107 These relationships spill over beyond that with the state National Guard, providing a conduit to develop economic ties and civilian engagement opportunities, further developing the resilient relationship between the United States and the foreign nation. 108 This "crown jewel" 109 of global engagement
should not be eliminated as the military draws down in a post conflict, fiscally constrained environment. To fully leverage its potential, this program should have a dedicated statutory authority. The terminology in the authority will make an unambiguous and permanent centralized oversight framework authority. That single authority will be responsible for overseeing and standardizing the full spectrum of engagement administration. This organization would be responsible for economic program implementation and tracking, interagency objective and metrics assessment development, and event data reporting and collection. The GCC's have unanimously espoused the benefits of the SPP and voiced their concern regarding reduced funding.
To fully leverage its potential, this program needs to be codified into law. 27
